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Introduction
The recent events surrounding the financial crisis and ensuing Great Recession
have sparked interest in uncertainty and in quantifying and documenting the effect of
uncertainty shocks on an economy. A core difficulty in examining this issue is finding an
appropriate proxy for uncertainty, a problem which researchers have solved by using a
range of measures including stock market volatility indices, the frequency of newspaper
articles mentioning uncertainty, and the forecast error on output projections (see Bloom
(2009), Bekaert, Hoerova and Lo Duca (2013), and Bachmann, Elstner, and Sims (2010),
among others). Previous scholars have also tried to illuminate the transmission channel of
uncertainty from a theoretical perspective (see Bernanke (1983), Brennan and Schwartz
(1985), McDonald and Siegel (1986), and others). While general macroeconomic
uncertainty has attracted much attention, policy uncertainty is only recently beginning to
generate interest (see Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2015)). Uncertainty surrounding central
bank actions has been largely ignored.
This paper attempts to explore this issue, one that we view as perhaps even more
important to economists than that of general uncertainty due to its policy relevance.
While general macroeconomic uncertainty may be irreducible, monetary policy
uncertainty is responsive to forward guidance. Previous research has shown that forward
guidance successfully lowers interest rate uncertainty (Filardo and Hoffman (2014)). The
subsequent question is then, how do such fluctuations in monetary policy uncertainty
affect real macroeconomic aggregates? The question is currently salient as the U.S.
economy begins to exit the zero interest rate regime of the past decade. Figure 1 shows
the relationship between output uncertainty, measured by output forecast dispersion, and
4

monetary policy uncertainty, measured by…. Prior to the financial crisis and zero-lower
bound, the two measures roughly tracked each other. However, post-2008, monetary
policy uncertainty has stayed at historically low levels, while output uncertainty rose
upward (see Figure 1). But as the Federal Funds rate begins to creep upward and the
media spotlight is directed at upcoming central bank actions, we would expect monetary
policy uncertainty to rise, which may prove to impact economic conditions in and of
itself.
We examine this issue using a highly flexible framework that allows for a timevarying response of macroeconomic aggregates to shocks to monetary policy
uncertainty. By allowing for such temporal shifts, we construct a more dynamic model
that allows for significant structural changes to occur at the zero-lower bound. The
proposed TVP-VAR also incorporates stochastic volatility, of particular relevance due to
the decline in interest rate volatility that accompanies a zero interest rate policy. We
estimate the model using panel-level interest rate forecast dispersion, to best capture both
fluctuations in the volatility of possible interest rate movements, as well as “Knightian”
uncertainty, meaning the rise and fall in forecasters’ confidence of the future interest rate
path.
Our results suggest that monetary policy uncertainty is of quantitative importance,
particularly at the zero-lower bound, and affects macroeconomic conditions via two
channels. First, an increase in monetary policy uncertainty leads to an immediate
decrease in output, the magnitude of which depends on the dataset used. Second, higher
levels of monetary policy uncertainty dampen the transmission of other monetary shocks.
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Specifically, at higher levels of interest rate uncertainty, movements in either the Federal
Funds rate or shocks to interest rate expectations (forward guidance) have a significantly
smaller effect on output.
These results have important implications when taken in the context of the current
state of the U.S. economy. As the Federal Reserve begins to exit the zero-lower bound,
monetary policy uncertainty is at its’ highest levels since pre-2008. Given the impact
forward guidance has on controlling uncertainty, the empirical findings show that the Fed
has an additional tool with which it can stimulate output. Or, if left unguided, interest rate
uncertainty can have direct and detrimental effects on output, or make other policy
measures less effective.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the current literature on
general macroeconomic uncertainty, Section 3 proposes basic theory through which
monetary policy uncertainty can affect the macroeconomy, Sections 4 and 5 discuss the
data and estimation procedure used, Section 6 presents the empirical results, Section 7
covers additional robustness checks, and Section 8 concludes.
A Literature Review of Uncertainty
The recent financial crisis and subsequent Great Recession catalyzed interest in
quantifying if and how uncertainty affects business cycle dynamics. To date, the concept
of uncertainty in economic literature has encompassed a wide range of concepts,
reflecting uncertainty about GDP growth, consumer and producer uncertainty, and
noneconomic events such as terrorism and war. Several key facts have been established
about the behavior of uncertainty, that general “uncertainty” both rises during recessions
6

and falls during expansions, that it likely explains a significant portion of the drop in
domestic GDP during the Great Recession, and that shocks to uncertainty affect behavior
through multiple channels (Bloom, 2014). These theoretical channels consist of four
mechanisms, two that suggest a negative relationship between uncertainty and output and
two that suggest a positive relationship.
I.

Theory

The first and most prominent theory regarding the effects of uncertainty
fluctuations on economic activity is that of real options (Bernanke (1983), Brennan and
Schwartz (1985), McDonald and Sigel (1986)). This theory postulates that firms view
investment decisions as “options,” options which they can postpone to another point in
the future. Thus, uncertainty makes firms more hesitant to make large investments,
fearing the costs of making a large purchase if the reward is unknown. For example, a
firm considering buying a new factory has the option to make the investment today, or to
wait for additional information regarding future economic conditions – the potential
return on that factory – by delaying the investment until a later date when uncertainty
about the future dissipates. Such “real options” mechanisms only come into effect when
investments are irreversible, or expensive and difficult to reverse. Firms must not be
selling into a perfectly competitive marketplace, where the choice of investment in one
period has no effect on profitability in a later one. If both these criteria are satisfied,
increased uncertainty is theorized to have an immediate downward effect on real
economic activity, incentivizing firms to postpone investment activities, followed by a
rebound, as the “pent-up” investments are then simply made at a later date.
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The second channel through which overall uncertainty is theorized to have a
negative impact on real economic activity is related to risk aversion. Higher levels of
uncertainty lead to increasing risk premia, as well as raise the probability of default via
increased probability of “black swan” events, ultimately raising borrowing costs. This
stifles investment activity and leads to reductions in macroeconomic growth (Arellano,
Bai, and Kehoe (2010); Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2014); Gilchrist, Sim, and
Zakrasjek (2011)). A subset of this channel is that of what Bloom (2014) deems the
“confidence effect,” whereby individuals have pessimistic beliefs about the future. In
such a case, when individuals are highly uncertain about the future, to the point that the
distribution of possible outcomes is actually unknown, pessimistic individuals act as
though the worst possible scenario will occur, showing an aversion to ambiguity. Finally,
aversion to the risk associated with higher uncertainty can lead to precautionary saving
on the part of consumers (Bansal and Yaron (2004)), depressing current consumption
spending. The potential offsetting increase in investment, however, will only happen if
one assumes New Keynesian characteristics (sticky prices) and a closed economy. As
shown in Leduc and Liu (2012), Basu and Bundick (2011), and Fernandez-Villaverde,
Guerron-Quintana, Kuester, and Rubio-Ramirez (2011), uncertainty shocks can depress
output if prices and interest rates do not fall enough after the initial drop in consumption
to stimulate investment.
While the real options and risk premium channels point to a negative relationship
between economic activity and uncertainty, two other theoretical channels point to a
positive one. The first of these, growth options, is based on the idea that uncertainty can
stimulate investment by making the potential reward seem even greater. This
8

phenomenon can serve as an explanation for the current tech boom in Silicon Valley – for
a “start-up” tech firm, the cost of a poor outcome are relatively small, given the lack of
capital requirements for a tech firm, while the potential good outcome (a highly
successful company that can be sold for a premium in the current manner equity markets
value tech firms) is highly profitable. The theory of growth options has been empirically
investigated in Kraft, Schwartz, and Weiss (2013), who show that growth options are
particularly important for firms investing heavily in R&D, to the point that higher levels
of uncertainty raise their equity value.
The fourth theoretical channel between uncertainty and economic activity is that
of Oi-Hartman-Abel effects, named after Oi (1961), Hartman (1972), and Abel (1983).
The theory postulates that firms may be risk-loving, not risk averse. Put differently, a
firm may expand to take advantage of potential good outcomes, and contract to protect
against poor ones. This is exemplified by the recent growth of the tech industry in Silicon
Valley. Firms, seeing the potential for excellent financial outcomes, actively take on
more risk, in an almost frenzied behavior. As such, an increase in uncertainty, if firms are
risk-loving and optimistic, may lead to increased production. However, this theory only
holds in the case of little to no adjustment costs, assuming firms can expand and contract
relatively easily.
The empirical literature that has tried to quantify the magnitude of these four
effects through either estimating responses to historical movements in uncertainty, using
structural models, or exploiting natural experiments such as climate disasters, has
provided “suggestive but not conclusive evidence” (Bloom (2014)) that negative effects
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outweigh the positive. A rise in uncertainty tends to be met with decreased short-run
output growth, investment, hiring, consumption, and trade. The medium to long-run
effects are much less conclusive.
II.

Policy Uncertainty

While the literature surrounding output uncertainty has recently expanded into an
extensive collection, there have been fewer studies of policy uncertainty, particularly
monetary policy uncertainty. Two studies that have narrowed down general uncertainty to
policy-based uncertainty are that of Born and Pfeifer (2011), who both theoretically and
empirically investigate the effects of broad policy uncertainty, particularly fiscal policy
uncertainty, as well as Shelton and Falk (2016), who examine electorally-induced policy
uncertainty.
Born and Pfeifer (2011) analyze the role of policy risk in business cycle
fluctuations using an estimated New Keynesian model including policy risk, measuring
uncertainty from aggregate time series using Sequential Monte Carlo Methods. Their
chosen proxy for policy uncertainty includes a mix of uncertainty about labor and capital
tax rates, monetary policy, and government spending. Although the authors find
significant evidence for the presence of policy risk in the data, they show that the “pure
uncertainty” effect of policy risk only plays a very small role in business cycle
fluctuations (Born and Pfeifer (2011)). However, the authors acknowledge that this is due
to the general equilibrium effects of the monetary authority’s strong and swift response
that significantly dampens the estimated effects in the DSGE model. Without this
response, the effect on output of an uncertainty shock would increase from -0.025% to 10

0.075%. However, a monetary authority that would not respond in such a way as it does
in their original model would also imply unrealistically extreme business cycle volatility,
an unlikely scenario.
Shelton and Falk (2016) empirically examine policy uncertainty from an electoral
standpoint, estimating the effect on investment in the manufacturing sector. Given that
policies relevant to business investment vary by political party, uncertainty about
upcoming governor political affiliation is a source of risk to firms when making
investment decisions. The authors use an instrumental variables approach to estimate that
the elasticity of manufacturing investment with respect to the vote margin of a
gubernatorial election is -0.027.
We provide a novel investigation of the effects of monetary policy uncertainty,
differing from the aforementioned literature on uncertainty and general policy
uncertainty. This comes at a time in which monetary policy uncertainty is in the spotlight,
having experienced an unprecedented truncation by nearly a decade at the zero-lower
bound. The policy implications of monetary policy uncertainty are motivated by the
findings of Filardo and Hoffman (2014), who find that forward guidance not only
effectively changes interest rate expectations, it lowers interest rate uncertainty – the term
premia – as well. Doehr and Martinez-Garcia (2015) effectively show the quantitatively
substantive effects of shocking interest rate expectations. However, failing to account for
the corresponding negative shock to uncertainty from a guidance episode may understate
the effectiveness of forward guidance as an alternative monetary policy tool.
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The Transmission Channels of Monetary Policy Uncertainty
I.

Direct Effects: Real Options

Similar to investment uncertainty, we propose that fluctuations in monetary policy
uncertainty directly influence macroeconomic aggregates through the “real options” and
channel. We propose that, when faced with increased uncertainty regarding the future
path of interest rates, economic agents postpone their investment and hiring decisions, in
the hopes of receiving clearer information in the near future about whether they are about
to enter a contractionary or expansionary policy period (or neither), which would directly
affect a firm’s ability to finance an investment decision, by raising or lowering their cost
of debt, as well as signaling the state of the economy – the return that investment may
yield in the near future.
In this way, an economy characterized by increased uncertainty regarding upcoming
central bank actions will witness a period of decreased output and inflation, as firms
postpone major investment and production decisions. On the other hand, economies in
which central banks use clear forward guidance to illustrate their preferred policy path –
or those that are bound by a zero interest rate policy – will eschew this phenomenon, as
agents rightly believe that waiting to make investment decisions will produce no better
information than that which they currently have on hand.
II.

Indirect Effects: Muting Policy Effectiveness Through Risk Aversion
The second channel through which monetary policy uncertainty affects economic

conditions indirect: by dampening the ability of the central bank to effectively use both
traditional monetary policy as well as unconventional monetary policy, specifically
12

forward guidance. The underlying channel was conceptually developed for general
economic uncertainty in Bloom (2009), and expanded here to incorporate monetary
policy and monetary policy expectations.
Bloom develops a firm-level production model where each production unit has
the following Cobb-Douglas production function:

~
~
F ( A , K , L , H )  A K  ( LH )1

(1)

~
in productivity ( A ), capital (K), labor (L), and hours (H). Hours are included

separately from wages to facilitate the determination of wages, which follows the
approach in Caballero and Engle (1993), in which wages are determined by undertime
and overtime hours around the standard work week. Each firm is faced with the following
demand curve:

Q  BP

(2)

with elasticity  . Bloom combines these into the revenue function:

~
~
R ( A, B, K , L, H )  A1 (1 /  ) B1 /  K  (1 (1 /  )) ( LH ) (1 )(1 (1 /  ))
where A combines unit-level productivity and demand into one general index,
termed “business conditions” These business conditions are key to the introduction of
monetary policy and monetary policy expectations into the model. Bloom assumes
business conditions evolve as an augmented geometric random walk, and models them as
a multiplicative composite of three separate random walks. These three components
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(3)

include a macro-level component AtM , a firm-level component AiF,t , and a unit-level
component AiU, j , t , to best model the assumptions that units within a single firm have
linked investment behavior due to common firm-level business conditions, and that they
still exhibit independent behavior from idiosyncratic unit-level shocks. Bloom models the
three components as follows:

AtM  AtM1 (1   t 1Wt M ), Wt M ~ N (0,1)

(4)

where  t is the standard deviation of business conditions, while Wt M is a macrolevel i.i.d normal shock. The second component, the firm-level component, is modelled
as:

AiF, t  AiF, t 1 (1   i , t   t 1Wi ,Ft ), Wi ,Rt ~ N (0,1)

(5)

where i , t is a firm-level trend in business conditions, while Wi ,Ft is a firm-level
i.i.d. normal shock. Finally, the unit-level component is modelled as:

AiU, j , t  AiU, j , t 1 (1   t 1WiU, j ,t ), WiU, j , t ~ N (0,1)
where WiU, j , t is a unit-level i.i.d. normal shock. The stochastic volatility process
and trend in demand conditions are assumed to follow two-point Markov chains. Bloom
finishes this model by adding adjustment costs including partial irreversibilities, fixed
disruption costs, and quadratic adjustment costs.
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(6)

The process of sollving the opttimization problem of m
maximizing thhe present
discounted flo
ow of revenu
ues less the wage
w
bill annd adjustmennt costs is deescribed in fuull in
Bloom
B
(2009).1
k relevant result
r
of the model is thaat it yields a central region of inactioon in
The key
th
he ( A / K , A / L) space. As
A such, unitts only engaage in hiring and investinng when bussiness
co
onditions A are sufficieently good, and
a only enggage in firingg and disinveestment wheen
bu
usiness cond
ditions are su
ufficiently poor. Uncertaainty comes into play byy making thiss
ceentral region
n of inaction
n wider by sh
hifting the thhresholds of action outwaard and upw
ward.
This
T is repressented as folllows:

Figure from
m Bloom (2009)..The inner region of inaction is w
where
th
he real‐option va
alue of waiting iss more valuable than the returnss to
investmennt or hiring

1

See paper for additional
a
assu
umptions the au
uthor makes thaat are necessarry to derive num
merical resultss and
in
ncorporate aggrregation into th
he model, as well
w as a compleete derivation oof the various aadjustment cossts.
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The saame represen
ntation of acction versus inaction, whhen faced wiith an increase in
un
ncertainty, is depicted ass:

Figuree from Bloom (20009).Thresholds at low and high
h
un
ncertainty. High uncertainty is tw
wice the value of low uncertaintty

 H  2 X t

Thesee show that an
a increase in
n uncertaintyy leads to a m
more insensitive econom
my to
ch
hanges in bu
usiness cond
ditions, as thee uncertaintyy shock causses the threshholds to shifft
ou
utward, and as a result, there
t
are no units next too any of the thresholds. T
Thus, a
su
ubsequent sh
hock to busin
ness conditio
ons leads to a dampenedd output respponse.
Whilee Bloom leav
ves business conditions ddefined geneerally as connditions
ultimately afffecting firm demand thatt apply to firrms, we morre definitivelly identify w
what
th
hose consist of, focusing
g in on AtM , or
o macro-levvel business conditions. Output
un
ncertainty sh
hocks are mo
odelled as tim
me variationns in the stanndard deviatiion of the
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driving process of the aforementioned business conditions,  t . Bloom choses to model
the volatility term as a two-state Markov process for simplicity, assuming it can either
take on the value of “low uncertainty” or “high uncertainty,” and the probability of being
in either state is only dependent on the current state. In reality, uncertainty can take a
continuous range of values . In the following, we explore the possible driving process of
those values. Currently, as written into the model, change in  t affect the uncertainty of
unit-level conditions, firm-level conditions, as well as macro-level conditions. Bloom
notes that he also evaluated this assumption by simulating an uncertainty shock to only
the variance of Wt M , which led to broadly similar results to those described in full above.
Thus, we are on sound footing to differentiate  t into the following:

 tW , macro-level uncertainty
 tF , firm-level uncertainty

 tU , unit-level uncertainty
knowing that shocks to

 tW lead to nearly the same results above. Macro-level

conditions in the model consist of interest rates, prices, and wages. We decompose

 tW

into these three components as follows:

 tM  U tM  [ t ( ti ) (1 ) ]  [  t ( tP ) (1 ) ]  [t ( tw ) (1 ) ]

(7)

 t   t  t  1

(8)

i
t

P
t
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w
t

0   ti , tP , tw  1
Macro-level “business conditions” uncertainty is a blend of interest rate
uncertainty, price level uncertainty, and wage uncertainty, where the relative weights of
each component are allowed to vary each time period but always sum to one. We also
extend the model to incorporate ambiguity aversion, or Knightian uncertainty, by scaling
the individual volatilities by a factor  t that represents how known the distribution  t is.
This is also allowed to vary each time period and is unique to each component (Knightian
certainty of interest rates, Knightian certainty of prices, and Knightian certainty of
wages). In the most extreme scenario of no Knightian uncertainty (the distribution of
possible movements is perfectly known to firms),  t takes on a value of 0, so the
exponential term collapses to 1, and no power effect comes into play to magnify the
volatility term. On the other extreme, if there is complete Knightian uncertainty,  t takes
on a value of 1, so the volatility term is squared before weighting it and combining it with
the other components.
In this way, monetary policy (interest rate) uncertainty is reflected in the model
through fluctuations in  ti as well as changes in  ti . Put differently, an increase in either
the volatility of monetary policy shocks or a decrease in the certainty of firms about the
possible distribution of those shocks both lead to an increase in  tM , which Bloom
shows shifts the thresholds of inaction outward. Thus, subsequent shocks to economic
conditions that affect macro-level demand – such as a monetary policy shock – lead to
dampened results of output. Similarly, Doehr and Martinez-Garcia (2015) show that
18

(9)

shocks to interest rate expectations are as important as shocks to the immediate interest
rate at the moment, moving output in a similar direction. Thus, an increase in monetary
policy uncertainty leads to an indirect result of making policy actions, both conventional
monetary policy as well as forward guidance, less effective. This highlights the potential
importance of forward guidance at the zero-lower bound. If a central bank has engaged in
a zero interest rate policy, truncating and lowering interest rate uncertainty, then shocks
to interest rate expectations may be even more effective at the zero-lower bound than
previously hypothesized.
Putting all the pieces together, monetary policy uncertainty has two different
transmission channels with which it affects real economic conditions. First, it has a direct
effect through the “wait and see” channel, similar to the idea of postponing investments
in the traditional uncertainty literature. Second, monetary policy uncertainty dampens
policy actions that affect interest rate shocks and interest rate expectations shocks
(forward guidance) through the mechanisms of Knightian uncertainty and volatility that
increase the areas of inaction for firms.
Empirical Strategy
I.

Data
We use interest rate forecasts from the Blue Chip Economic Indicators (BCEI)

survey, a survey of leading business economists, to generate our uncertainty proxies, as
well as to gauge monetary policy expectations. The BCEI provides the panel’s monthly
arithmetic average one quarter, two quarter, three quarter, and four quarter ahead
forecasts of fifteen different macroeconomic variables, in addition to the top 90th
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percentile forecast and the bottom 10th percentile forecast for each forecast horizon. To
extract monetary policy uncertainty from this panel, we use the dispersion of the forecasts
of the panel’s expectation of the rate on the three month Treasury bill, calculated as the
difference between the top 90th percentile and the bottom 10th percentile. Each month,
we use the longest consistent forecast horizon available (four quarters ahead) to measure
disagreement among forecasters as our primary measure of monetary policy uncertainty.
We also use the reported arithmetic mean forecast of the corresponding four quarter
ahead interest rate as the measure of interest rate expectations in the TVP-VAR. This
panel of forecasts is taken from 1991:M7 through 2015:M11.
We make forecast dispersion our benchmark measure of policy uncertainty, rather
than forecast errors or stock market volatility, two commonly used metrics, due to several
factors. Measures of forecast error, while undoubtedly capturing some aspects of
uncertainty, are also measuring “wrongness,” as well as uncertainty – one can be
completely certain and still be incorrect about the future, which would be recorded as a
large forecast error. Equity and credit market volatilities, other commonly used measures,
were not chosen for the benchmark, as equity markets are too far removed from what we
are specifically capturing – monetary policy uncertainty – while measures of volatility in
credit markets, e.g. the Ted spread or various ARCH measures, confound perceived
default risk along with actual interest rate uncertainty, again not reflecting pure monetary
policy uncertainty. We choose to tease out and use Knightian uncertainty from the SPF to
more clearly distinguish between known default risks and true uncertainty, where the
expected distribution of outcomes is unknown (Knight (1921)). The BCEI provides a rich
picture of forecaster’s immediate interest rate expectations, and a measure of cross20

sectional disagreement derived from such survey data has been shown to be an accurate
portrayal of the corresponding Knightian uncertainty (see Bomberger (1996), Patton and
Timmerman (2010)).
As a robustness check, we use a separate measure of monetary policy uncertainty.
We also utilize data from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) from the Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, which surveys a panel of economists and offers individual
forecasts for a variety of macroeconomic variables. The dataset contains the entire panel
of forecasts for the interest rate on the three month Treasury bill one quarter ahead, two
quarters ahead, three quarters ahead, and one year ahead. To construct a measure of
uncertainty from this, we take the standard deviation of the forecast for the rate on the
three month Treasury one year ahead, for the same reasons described above regarding
forecast dispersion. We use the corresponding median forecast of the interest rate each
quarter as our measure of the actual interest rate expectations in the TVP-VAR when
running the model with SPF data rather than BCEI data.
All other variables used in our analysis – the core inflation rate, the civilian
unemployment rate, the Federal Funds rate, oil prices, and monetary base growth – were
taken from the St. Louis Federal Reserve database.
A more detailed description of the data and sources can be found in the Appendix.
All data is at either a quarterly or monthly frequency from 1991:M7 through 2015:M11
or 1981:Q3 through 2015:Q2, to match the respective BCEI or SPF panel.
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II.

Methodology
Time-varying parameter VARs (TVP-VARs) are broadly used in economic

literature to capture the possible time-varying nature of the macroeconomy, particularly
in monetary policy analysis (Nakajima, 2009). After Primiceri (2005) introduced a TVPVAR model that allows for all parameters to vary over time, several papers followed that
analyzed the time-varying structure of the macroeconomy in certain ways (see Benati and
Mumtaz (2005), Baumeister et al. (2008), and D’Agostino et al. (2008)). Among these,
we highlight Nakajima (2009), who added the possibility of stochastic volatility into the
TVP-VAR, as well as the relevant contributions of Franta (2011), who employed an
identification scheme based on sign restrictions in the Japanese economy. Given our goal
of examining the underlying structural shifts in the U.S. economy at the zero-lower
bound, particularly in regards to the transmission of monetary policy with uncertainty and
expectations, we chose to utilize the modeling framework proposed by Franta (2011) that
allows for both stochastic volatility as well as sign restrictions.
A TVP-VAR that allows for stochastic volatility enables us to capture both
temporary and permanent shifts in parameters, including that of the volatility of the
disturbances. The idea of stochastic volatility was first proposed by Black (1976), and has
been further developed, particularly in the field of financial economics (Nakajima, 2009).
When the data generating process has both time-varying coefficients as well as stochastic
shocks, then using a model that exclusively allows coefficients to vary and assumes
constant volatility may potentially bias estimates. This is of particular relevance when
modeling the economy at the zero-lower bound, as we do here. The zero-lower bound
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truncates possible downward movements in both the Federal Funds rate itself, as well as
expectations of the 3-month Treasury bill, significantly reducing potential fluctuations of
those two variables. In this way, a TVP-VAR with stochastic volatility allows us to more
accurately incorporate the role of the zero-lower bound in the transmission of monetary
policy throughout the macroeconomy, rather than assuming the volatility of the
disturbances of the interest rate, interest rate expectations, and monetary policy
uncertainty are constant at any level of the Federal Funds rate. Similarly, given that our
objective is examining the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, it is crucial to
distinguish between changes in the size of exogenous innovations—the stochastic
volatility—and underlying shifts in the transmission mechanism itself (Mumtaz, 2005).
The second key characteristic of our chosen methodology is that of incorporating
sign restrictions in the TVP-VAR, following the framework of Franta (2011). Sign
restrictions are a manner in which we can further incorporate the binding effects of the
zero-lower bound into the model—as well as avoid encountering puzzles common in
macroeconomic VARs (Franta, 2011). The zero-lower bound on the nominal interest rate
is implemented during the identification of the shocks rather than during the initial model
estimation. Previous attempts in the literature to examine the transmission of monetary
policy at the zero-lower bound impose assumptions from the very beginning of the
estimation, such as treating the interest rate as a censored variable, using a Markovswitching VAR, or a estimating a censored VAR where the latent variable capture the
stance of monetary policy and equals the interest rate if it exceeds zero (see Nakajima
(2011), Fujiwara (2006), and Iwata and Wu (2006)). The approach we follow, à la Franta
(2011), imposes the zero lower bound at a later stage, when estimating impulse response
23

functions, while estimating the initial reduced-form TVP-VAR without restrictions as it is
flexible enough to handle nonlinearities stemming from the floor on interest rates.
Similarly, using structural assumptions in the form of sign restrictions lets us relax the
oftentimes inappropriate assumptions of the more typical recursive VAR ordering, that
shocks to some endogenous variables do not have any simultaneous effects on those that
come before them in the recursive ordering. Sign restrictions allow us to base our
empirical model in economic theory rather than be tied to the characteristics of the
specific dataset itself and a particular recursive ordering, making it easier to interpret the
TVP VAR evidence using the standard New-Keynesian model. For those shocks that do
not have a robust underlying economic theory – namely, shocks to monetary policy
uncertainty and the effects of shocks to other economic variables on policy uncertainty –
we adapt the model framework to allow for an unspecified response or effect, relaxing
any sign restrictions to let the data simply speak for itself. A more detailed description of
the exact restrictions chosen can be found in the discussion of the benchmark model.
The following model and estimation approach closely follow Primiceri (2005)2, a
multivariate time series framework with varying coefficients that captures nonlinearities
and time-variation in the parameters, while also accounting for possible
heteroscedasticity of the disturbances (Arratibel and Michaelis, 2014). We estimate the
VAR model in the following manner:

y t  ct   1,t y t 1 ...   1,t y t l  u t

t = 1,…,T

2

See Primiceri (2005) for a more in depth analysis of the model specification, assumptions, and estimation
technique, as well as Nakajima (2009) for a more extensive discussion of the role of stochastic volatility.
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where the vector of endogenous variables yt is of the size n x 1; ct , the vector of timevarying coefficients that multiply constant terms of of the size n x n; the time-varying
coefficients  i,t with the lag length t have the size n x n, and ut , of the size size n x 1, are
unknown stochastic shocks with time-variation in the covariance matrix of the error
terms.
The matrix capturing simultaneous relations, At, is lower triangular, denoted as:

 1

 21,t
At =  

M1,t

0







 
 M,M1,t

0

0

1

 t is an M(Mp + 1) x 1 vector of the effects of lagged endogenous variables on the
system, and the matrix of standard deviations of the structural shocks,



t



t

, is diagonal:

 1,t 0  0 
 0  
 

=    
0 


 0  0  M ,t 

The reduced form time-varying VAR to be estimated can then be summarized as:
yt  X t  t  At1 t  t

t = p + 1,…T,

The dynamics of the time-varying parameters follow a random walk without drift, while
the covariance matrix evolves as a geometric random walk with no drift, shown as:
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 i ,t   i , t 1  ut1

i = 1,…M2p + M,

 i , t   i ,t 1  vt1

i = 1,…(M2- M)/2,

log(  i,t ) = log(  i ,t 1 ) + wti

i = 1,…M

Using a random walk to model the underlying dynamics provides a highly flexible
framework to capture the evolving nature of different parameters coming from potential
shifts in the macroeconomy (Arratibel and Michaelis, 2014).
The vector of model innovations [  t' , u t' , v t' , wt' ] is assumed to be jointly
normally distributed, as the following:

 t   I M 0 0 0  
u   

U
0
0
0

t
  ~N 0, 


 vt 
 0 0 V 0 

   
 
w
W
0
0
0

 t  
where vectors ut, vt, and wt consist of innovations as introduced above, and the matrices
U, V and W are positive definite. V is assumed to be block diagonal, implying that the
parameters of the contemporaneous effects among variables are independent,
uncorrelated across equations.
Consistent with the Bayesian approach, a Gibbs sampler is used to evaluate the
posterior distribution of the unobservable states  i,t ,  j,t ,  k ,t , and the hyperparameters
U, V, and W (see Blake and Mumtaz, 2012, for a detailed explanation of Bayesian
estimation of TVP-VARs with stochastic volatility). To perform the estimation of the
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posteriors, the Gibbs sampler provides draws from the conditional posteriors of the set of
parameters. In order to do this, we need to specify the distribution of the priors. U, V, and
W follow the independent inverse Wishart distribution, consistent with the literature,
while the priors for the initial states of the other parameters,  i,t ,  j,t , and log(  k ,t ) are
normally distributed. Consistent with Primiceri (2005), we use a small subset of the data
set estimated through ordinary least squares (specifically, the first 40 months of the time
series) to form estimations used in the specification of the prior distributions.
After initializing the parameters, a draw is taken from the distribution of the
vector  , given the other parameters A,



, hyperparameters U, and the data. Next, the

Gibbs sampler goes over U first, producing a draw, and continues on over the other
subsets of the parameter set (A, V,



, and W). This process is then repeated, ultimately

providing posterior numerical evaluations of the parameters. For this estimation, we use
the same specification of the priors (kq, ks, and kw) as in Primiceri (2005), which are
consistent with the literature, and slightly tighter than those used in Nakajima (2009),
attributing more of the time variation to the disturbances (  ) rather than the parameter
estimates (  ) themselves. Primiceri’s tighter priors negate the possibility of erroneously
attributing additional time variation to the parameters when they are truly closer to time
invariant.3 This is further confirmed by Stock and Watson (1996), who show that models

3

We also estimate the model using the code and methodology of Nakajima (2009) as a robustness check.
The results show higher parameter instability and less stochastic volatility, while nevertheless confirming
the critical importance of monetary policy uncertainty and expectations in the transmission of monetary
policy, and the structural shifts that occur at the zero-lower bound. More detailed results are available upon
request from the author.
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with large a priori time variation do poorly in forecasting, and that allowing for
significant time variation in the volatilities is fundamental to improving the model fit.
To recover the impulse-response functions (IRF’s) after the initial model
estimation, we identify five structural shocks (monetary policy uncertainty, interest rate
expectations, inflation, unemployment, and the Federal Funds rate) by using sign
restrictions on the contemporaneous reactions of the other variables to the shocks, as in
Franta (2011).4 We base our sign restrictions on assumptions about the behavior of the
system, imposing qualitative information requirements on the IRF’s. Certain responses
are left unidentified, to be determined by the data (see Faust, 1998, Uhlig, 2005) when
there is uncertainty surrounding the underlying economic theory, or in the case of our
measure of monetary policy uncertainty, where the specific variable itself and its
construction is novel in economic literature. We consider four different types of
restrictions: positive, negative, zero, or unidentified (see Table 2), and motivate our sign
choices by results found in Doehr and Martínez-García (2015), in which the authors
estimate a four variable panel VAR that includes interest rate expectations in addition to
inflation, unemployment, and the Federal Funds rate. The sign restrictions imposed here
on the effects from shocks to “realized” economic variables (inflation, unemployment,
and the Federal Funds rate) are consistent with the findings of Doehr and MartínezGarcía (2015)—as well as economic theory. The restrictions imposed on the effects from
shocks to interest rate expectations account for the reversal in the response of output by
leaving that response unspecified, while restricting the responses of inflation and the

4

See Franta (2011) for a detailed explanation of the estimation procedure for impulse response functions
using sign restrictions.
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Federal Funds rate to nearly zero. Shocks to monetary policy uncertainty or the effect of a
shock on monetary policy uncertainty are always left unspecified.
The model estimation and additional procedures were estimated in Matlab5 using
one lag of the endogenous variables. Given the relatively high number of parameters
estimated in this five variable VAR, allowing for any more lags leads to convergence
issues, as the number of parameters to be estimated rapidly explodes. We use a sample of
10,000 iterations of the Gibbs sampler, with a burn-in of 2,000.
III.

Results

Benchmark Model
The specification of our benchmark TVP VAR is motivated by the New
Keynesian model, the standard three variable VAR, augmented with both expectations of
future monetary policy as well as uncertainty surrounding those expectations. The
inclusion of the first of these two channels—expectations of monetary policy—is driven
by the results found in Doehr and Martínez-García (2015), that expectations of monetary
policy themselves can generate a response in macroeconomic variables even if no policy
change takes place. This allows us to explicitly differentiate between innovations to
anticipated monetary policy (news shocks) and unexpected monetary policy shocks. The
inclusion of monetary policy uncertainty is motivated by the underlying theory of
forward guidance: that providing guidance to economic agents not only changes interest
rate expectations themselves, but decreases the corresponding uncertainty, particularly

5

The model used code for a TVP VAR with stochastic volatility and sign restrictions, made publicly
available by Haroon Mumtaz (Benati and Mumtaz, 2005).

29

when traditional policy rates are fixed by the zero-lower bound (Filardo and Hoffman
(2014). By including uncertainty in the VAR, we also not only allow for the simulation
of shocks to uncertainty itself, but we incorporate any potential indirect, non-linear
effects described previously in the transmission mechanism of monetary uncertainty into
the econometric model. We use the dispersion of the expectation of the one-year ahead
rate on the 3-Month Treasury as the proxy for monetary policy uncertainty in the
benchmark, performing robustness checks by using alternative measures (the Survey of
Professional Forecasters) in a later model. We find that monetary policy uncertainty plays
a significant role in the macroeconomy not only directly, but by indirectly shaping the
transmission of other shocks throughout the economy. We focus our analysis on the
impulse-response functions, the recovered stochastic volatilities, and an analysis of
nonlinearities in the model.
A. Impulse-Response Functions
The impulse response functions from the benchmark model are presented in
Figure 3, showing the responses over 5 years (60 months) and the time period 2001:M7 –
2015:M11 to one standard deviation shocks to the endogenous variables in the VAR. We
can first clearly see what influences monetary policy uncertainty itself, and that, in some
cases, the way in which other macroeconomic variables affect monetary policy
uncertainty has changed over time. In Figure 3b, we find that a shock to interest rate
expectations leads to a rise in monetary policy uncertainty. Of important note is the fact
that this effect is magnified at the zero-lower bound: after 2008, a rise in forecasts of
future short-term rates has nearly twice the initial effect on monetary policy uncertainty.
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We theorize that this is due, in part, to the fact that at the zero-lower bound, interest rate
expectations are truncated at zero—the possibility of downward revisions to forecasts is
eliminated, as the distribution itself can move no farther downward. Thus, an upward
shock to interest rate expectations at the zero-lower bound shifts the distribution upward,
inducing the possibility of downward revisions to forecasts. This impulse-response
function can also be explained by the focus on interest rates when they are bounded by
zero. We see in the data in Figure 2 that over the past 3-4 quarters, as talk of rising rates
has begun in earnest, interest rate expectations as well as monetary policy uncertainty
have started to tick upward. Even a very small positive movement in rate forecasts,
relative to the historical range of interest rates, leads to this spike in policy uncertainty, as
the security of the zero-lower bound policy is left behind even though we are still at the
zero-lower bound. Shocks to unemployment have also had time-varying effects on
monetary policy uncertainty (see Figure 3d), as prior to the Great Recession a positive
shock to unemployment had very little impact on uncertainty. However, this response has
gradually been magnified since 2008, implying increased confidence in the Federal
Reserve’s response to such an event. We also find that a shock to the Federal Funds rate
leads to a spike in uncertainty. This effect is most heightened at the onset of the financial
crisis, after which it dies down. Interestingly, the magnitude of the response is in the
process of spiking upward again, implying an increased sensitivity to movements in the
Federal Funds rate. This may again be due to the loss of the binding zero-lower bound on
the potential distribution of rates. After being truncated by zero for so long, an upward
movement induces the possibility of downward movements again. Another possible
explanation is the increased scrutiny of the Federal Reserve’s actions in the past few
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quarters, as talks of rising rates begin in earnest. Thus, any uptick in rates by the central
bank that may signal the end of the zero interest rate policy leads to a heightened
response of uncertainty.
We also highlight several other key impulse-response functions in the benchmark
model. In Figure 3b, we see that even when including monetary policy uncertainty in the
model, the effect on the unemployment rate from a shock to interest rate expectations still
displays the extreme parameter instability found in Doehr and Martínez-García (2015),
where the response of output entirely reverses at the zero lower bound: a rise in expected
monetary policy leads to an increase in unemployment, in sharp contrast to the decrease
in unemployment found prior to 2007. In Figure 3e, we show that a tightening of the
policy instrument itself, the Federal Funds rate, leads to an immediate decrease in
inflation. Using core inflation rather than headline inflation in conjunction with including
monetary policy expectations as an additional variable successfully mitigates the price
puzzle found in many such VARs, providing corroborating evidence for Sims (1992) and
Giordani (2004)’s theory that price puzzles arise from un-modelled inflationary pressures
that lead to price increases only captured by including commodity prices such as oil to
resolve the puzzle. Given that core inflation excludes such un-modelled pressures, this
impulse-response function demonstrates the effectiveness of unexpected monetary policy
in bringing down non-commodity prices.
Finally, we consider the direct effects of a shock to monetary policy uncertainty
itself on other macroeconomic indicators (see Figure 3a). As postulated in the “wait and
see” theory, the responses of output and inflation are immediate and imply a depressed
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economic state, with an increase in unemployment and decrease in inflation. These also
display parameter instability, with the responses heightened at the zero-lower bound. It is
important, however, to gauge the magnitude of these responses relative to, say, a
traditional monetary policy shock. The equivalent positive one standard deviation shock
to the Federal Funds rate leads to a maximum response of unemployment of nearly 3.0%,
while the uncertainty shock alone only leads to an increase on the order of 0.3%, or 10%
the size of the former response. This is a relatively small direct effect when considered in
the context of traditional monetary policy, though nevertheless a conclusive and long
lasting effect. These impulse-response functions show that when traditional monetary
policy becomes constrained by the zero-lower bound, forward guidance shocks that
decrease monetary policy uncertainty can indeed have direct effects on stimulating
output, albeit not of the magnitude of traditional policy. However, it is also important to
consider the possible non-linear effects of uncertainty that are not immediately reflected
in these impulse-response functions but nevertheless may shape how forward guidance
ripples through the economy.
B. Modeling Non-Linearities in Uncertainty
While it has been shown that interest rate expectations play a significant and
direct role in shaping the macroeconomy, monetary policy uncertainty may play a more
nuanced role, though just as important. Monetary policy uncertainty is akin to the ‘second
moment’ of interest rate expectations, capturing the steadfastness with which economic
agents hold their beliefs about the future path of policy. Simply shocking the certainty
with which people hold their beliefs is not enough to generate significant economic
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responses; however, the propagation of other shocks throughout the economy is
dependent on the level of certainty in the future policy path at that time. As stated in the
discussion of the transmission channel of monetary policy uncertainty, higher levels of
uncertainty may dampen the ultimate effect of expected monetary policy shocks by
causing agents to place more weight on the current interest rate environment when faced
with a series of unknown movements in future interest rates. We examine this empirically
by calculating the cumulative response of other variables to shocks to unexpected and
expected monetary policy at each horizon in the impulse-response function (s=1…s=20),
and regress these cumulative impacts against the level of monetary policy uncertainty
measured at that time, while simultaneously controlling for other potential confounding
variables. Results are shown in Figure 4.
Our results show that the level of monetary policy uncertainty plays a formidable
role in the dynamics of the macroeconomy, particularly in regards to the effectiveness of
unconventional monetary policy, forward guidance. In Figure 4, we can see that a one
unit increase in monetary policy uncertainty – roughly equivalent to a one standard
deviation increase - is associated with a decrease in the maximum impulse-response
function of unemployment of -0.063%. Considering that the average maximum response
of unemployment is 0.28%, this represents a 23% decrease in the typical response of
unemployment to an expectations shock, a significant amount, statistically significant at
the 99% confidence level. As theorized, higher levels of uncertainty significantly dampen
the propagation of unconventional monetary policy actions taken by the Federal Reserve.
Similarly, we find that a one unit increase in monetary policy uncertainty is associated
with a decrease in the cumulative response of unemployment from s=1 to s=20 of -1.20,
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or of 42% of the average cumulative response, 2.81, again significant at the 99%
confidence level. Finally, we consider the shape of the response, the slope of the response
function. We find that a one unit increase in uncertainty is associated with a decrease in
the slope of -0.06, significant at the 5% level, implying that not only does uncertainty
cause less of a cumulative total response in output, but makes that response more gradual.
Robustness Checks6
I.

Survey of Professional Forecasters

To consider the robustness of the results to other measures of uncertainty, we also
utilize data from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (see Appendix for additional
detail). Given that the SPF reports the entire panel, rather than simply the median forecast
and select percentiles, we construct our measure of interest rate uncertainty as the
standard deviation of the one year ahead forecasts of the 3-month Treasury bill each
quarter. The other, “real” variables – core inflation, unemployment, and the Federal
Funds rate – are kept the same in the TVP-VAR. Results from the corresponding
impulse-response functions and multivariate regressions are reported in Figures 5 and 6
in the Appendix.
Overall, we find that the same themes emerge that were found in the Blue Chip data.
Monetary policy uncertainty has a direct and detrimental effect on output, and higher
levels of uncertainty dampen the ultimate effect of monetary policy actions (shocks to
anticipated and unanticipated monetary policy). The key differences of the SPF results lie
6

Although omitted here for the sake of brevity, we also run robustness checks using different lengths of the
forecast horizon, of both the Blue Chip and SPF data, and find confirmatory results in shorter forecast
horizons. Results are available upon request from the authors.
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in the relative magnitude of these effects. The SPF data yields smaller direct effects, and
larger indirect effects (non-linearities). Beginning with the former, we see that a direct
shock to monetary policy uncertainty leads to a significantly smaller and less conclusive
negative response of output than we find in the Blue Chip data – and one that recovers
quicker. However, higher levels of monetary policy uncertainty have indirect effects on
the transmission of monetary policy shocks to both output and inflation, by dampening
the effect on output (as found in the Blue Chip data), as well as strengthening the
response of inflation, something not seen in the Blue Chip data. Put differently, higher
levels of monetary policy uncertainty actually make an interest rate hike more effective at
pulling inflation down. This could be due to forecasters, in times of high monetary policy
uncertainty, grabbing onto whatever guidance is provided to them by the central bank
when they form their inflation expectations, and ultimately propagating those into actual
inflation. In times of lower uncertainty, guidance is simply less impactful, as forecasters
already have their own information sets they are relatively confident in, making
additional news less effective.
Concluding Remarks
The dual effects of monetary policy uncertainty on the economy, directly
depressing output as well as indirectly stifling the effectiveness of both conventional and
non-conventional monetary policy actions, illuminates the complexities of an
expectations-driven business cycle. It also provides evidence for the importance of
managing interest rate uncertainty as a policy tool in and of itself. In this paper we
empirically investigate both channels with a TVP-VAR that allows for stochastic
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volatility, augmenting the traditional three-variable New-Keynesian model with both
interest rate expectations and interest rate uncertainty. We find that short term interest
rate uncertainty plays a moderate role in its immediate effect on current output, while
playing a highly significant role in the propagation of monetary policy shocks through the
economy. These effects are seen just as strongly at the zero-lower bound as in “normal”
policy times. As such, we find strong evidence that downward pressure on monetary
policy uncertainty can be an important policy tool in stimulating output and assuring the
proper transmission of other policy shocks. This provides a case for the use of forward
guidance when traditional monetary policy has become bounded by zero. While the
immediate effects are not as quantitatively substantial as direct shocks to the Federal
Funds Rate itself, when moving the Federal Funds Rate is no longer a viable option for
policymakers, guidance can provide another means of steering the economy. Managing
policy expectations, as shown in Doehr and Martinez-Garcia (2015), in conjunction with
managing policy uncertainty, can together make a significant opportunity for guiding an
economy when traditional monetary policy measures are no longer realistic options.
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Appendix
Table 1 - Data

ie3m,t+4ӏt(j)

Description
Source
Expected short-term rate FRB.P
(SPF)

UCc MP

Monetary policy
FRB.P
uncertainty – dispersion
(SPF)
ie3m,t+4ӏt(j) Expected short-term rate BCEI
(BC)

UCc MP

Monetary policy
uncertainty – dispersion
(BC)

BCEI

πct

Inflation rate (core CPI)

FRED

ut
yt

Unemployment rate
Real GDP growth

FRED
FRED

it
MG

Fed Funds rate
Monetary Base

FRED
FRED

OG

Oil Price

FRED

Comments
Forecasts 4 quarters ahead of the 3month T-bill (annualized rates, %) for
a varying sample of j forecasters in
each quarter
Standard deviation of ie3m,t+4ӏt for each
quarter for a varying sample of j
forecasters in each quarter
Forecasts 4 quarters ahead of the 3month T-bill (annualized rates, %) for
a varying sample of j forecasters in
each quarter. Dataset reports
arithmetic average of panel j.
Difference between top 90th and
bottom 10th decile of ie3m,t+4ӏt for each
month for a varying sample of j
forecasters in each month
Seasonally-adjusted, month-overmonth (%)
Seasonally-adjusted (%)
Seasonally-adjusted, month-overmonth (%)
Annualized rate (%)
St. Louis Adjusted Monetary Base,
month-over-month (%)
West Texas Intermediate Crude Oil
Price, month-over-month (%)

Note: All data calculated by the authors are available upon request. The acronym SPF stands for the Survey
of Professional Forecasters; BCEI stands for Blue Chip Economic Indicators; FRED stands for Federal
Reserve Economic Database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; FRB.P stands for Federal Reserve
Bank of Philadelphia; and FRB.A stands for Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
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Table 2 – Sign Restrictions
Shock
Monetary
Policy
Uncertainty
Interest Rate
Expectations
Core Inflation
Unemployment
Rate
Federal Funds
Rate

Monetary
Interest
Policy
Rate
Uncertainty Expectations
+
None

Core
Inflation

Unemployment
Rate

None

None

Federal
Funds
Rate
None

None

+

-

None

+

None
None

0
None

+
-

None
+

+
-

None

0

-

+

+
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Figure 1 – Uncertainty Measures
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
-1
-2

Output Uncertainty

Monetary Policy Uncertainty

40

Figure 2 – TVP-VAR Model Inputs
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Figure 4a – Nonlinearities

VARIABLES
Uncertainty
Tbill6
Inflation
Unemployment
Fed Funds Rate
Monetary Base
Oil Price
Constant

(1)
Maximum IRF ‐ Shock:
FFR; Response:
Unemployment
‐2.634***
(0.449)
‐1.582***
(0.416)
‐0.986
(1.819)
0.311**
(0.125)
0.439
(0.315)
‐0.0834**
(0.0400)
‐0.0261
(0.0162)
7.902***
(1.056)

Observations
173
R‐squared
0.774
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(1)

VARIABLES
Uncertainty
Tbill6
Inflation
Unemployment
Fed Funds Rate
Monetary Base
Oil Price
Constant

(2)
Maximum IRF ‐ Shock:
FFR; Response: Inflation

(3)
Maximum IRF ‐ Shock:
Tbill6; Response:
Unemployment

(4)
Maximum IRF ‐ Shock:
Tbill6; Response:
Inflation

‐0.0157***
(0.00408)
0.00942**
(0.00378)
‐0.00957
(0.0165)
0.00663***
(0.00113)
‐0.00803***
(0.00287)
‐0.000620*
(0.000363)
3.92e‐05
(0.000147)
0.00598
(0.00960)

‐0.373***
(0.0539)
‐0.0942*
(0.0500)
0.128
(0.218)
0.0814***
(0.0150)
0.0494
(0.0379)
‐0.00518
(0.00480)
0.000392
(0.00194)
0.682***
(0.127)

‐0.200***
(0.0290)
‐0.0498*
(0.0269)
‐0.134
(0.118)
‐0.0139*
(0.00808)
0.0437**
(0.0204)
0.00302
(0.00259)
0.000365
(0.00105)
0.505***
(0.0684)

173
0.420

173
0.708

173
0.506

(3)

(4)

Figure 4b – Nonlinearities
(2)

Cumulative Response at Cumulative Response at Cumulative Response at Cumulative Response at
s=60: Unemployment;
s=60: Inflation; Shock:
s=60: Unemployment;
s=60: Inflation; Shock:
Shock: FFR
FFR
Shock: Tbill6
Tbill6
‐1.658***
(0.406)
‐0.902**
(0.377)
‐2.199
(1.646)
0.189*
(0.113)
0.294
(0.285)
‐0.0284
(0.0362)
0.00191
(0.0146)
4.829***
(0.956)

Observations
173
R‐squared
0.587
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

‐0.00950
(0.0359)
‐0.00965
(0.0333)
‐0.188
(0.146)
0.00712
(0.00999)
0.0126
(0.0253)
7.99e‐05
(0.00320)
‐0.000856
(0.00130)
‐0.0164
(0.0846)

‐0.202***
(0.0714)
‐0.0985
(0.0662)
0.183
(0.289)
0.0515**
(0.0198)
0.0115
(0.0502)
‐0.000374
(0.00636)
0.00246
(0.00257)
0.519***
(0.168)

0.00461
(0.00672)
0.00315
(0.00624)
‐0.00706
(0.0272)
‐0.00294
(0.00187)
‐0.000576
(0.00472)
‐0.000142
(0.000599)
‐6.84e‐05
(0.000242)
0.0167
(0.0158)

173
0.026

173
0.501

173
0.126
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Figure 4c – Nonlinearities

VARIABLES
Uncertainty
Tbill6
Inflation
Unemployment
Fed Funds Rate
Monetary Base
Oil Price
Constant

(1)
IRF Slope Through s=30;
Shock: FFR, Response:
Unemployment

(2)
IRF Slope Through s=30;
Shock: FFR, Response:
Inflation

(3)
IRF Slope Through s=30;
Shock: Tbill6, Response:
Unemployment

(4)
IRF Slope Through s=30;
Shock: Tbill6, Response:
Inflation

‐0.0553***
(0.0135)
‐0.0301**
(0.0126)
‐0.0733
(0.0549)
0.00629*
(0.00376)
0.00980
(0.00951)
‐0.000948
(0.00121)
6.37e‐05
(0.000488)
0.161***
(0.0319)

‐0.000317
(0.00120)
‐0.000322
(0.00111)
‐0.00627
(0.00486)
0.000237
(0.000333)
0.000420
(0.000842)
2.66e‐06
(0.000107)
‐2.85e‐05
(4.32e‐05)
‐0.000547
(0.00282)

‐0.00675***
(0.00238)
‐0.00328
(0.00221)
0.00609
(0.00964)
0.00172**
(0.000662)
0.000383
(0.00167)
‐1.25e‐05
(0.000212)
8.22e‐05
(8.58e‐05)
0.0173***
(0.00560)

0.000154
(0.000224)
0.000105
(0.000208)
‐0.000235
(0.000908)
‐9.79e‐05
(6.23e‐05)
‐1.92e‐05
(0.000157)
‐4.74e‐06
(2.00e‐05)
‐2.28e‐06
(8.08e‐06)
0.000558
(0.000527)

173
0.026

173
0.501

173
0.126

Observations
173
R‐squared
0.587
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 5a – Shock to Monetary P
Policy Unceertainty (SP
PF)

Figure 5b
b – Shock to
o Interest R
Rate Expectations (SPF
F)
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Fig
gure 5c – Sh
hock to Corre Inflation (SPF)

Fig
gure 5d – Sh
hock to Uneemploymen
nt Rate
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Figurre 5e – Shocck to Federaal Funds Raate (SPF)

Figure 6a
a – Nonlineaarities (SPF
F)
(1)

V
VARIABLES
U
Uncertainty
T
Tbill6
Inflation
U
Unemployment
F Funds Rate
Fed
M
Monetary
Base
O Price
Oil
C
Constant

(2)

(3)

(4
4)

Maximum IRFF ‐‐ Shock:
FFR; Resp
ponse:
Unemployyment

Maximum IRF ‐‐ Sh
hock:
FFR
R; Response: Inflation

Maximum IRF ‐‐ Shock::
Tbill6; Response:
Uneemployment

Maximum IRF ‐‐ Shock:
onse: Inflation
Tbill6; Respo

‐0.260****
(0.062
29)
0.0025
50
(0.023
34)
0.112
2*
(0.062
27)
‐0.018
84*
(0.010
02)
‐0.011
12
(0.019
93)
0.0001
179
(0.0017
77)
4.13e‐‐05
(0.0007
781)
0.993****
(0.074
48)

‐0.331***
(0.0544)
0.00977
(0.0203)
0.0911*
(0.0542)
‐0.0144
(0.00884)
‐0.0140
(0.0167)
0.00574***
(0.00153)
0.000701
(0.000676)
0.352***
(0.0647)

0.0653
(0.0627)
‐0.00583
(0.0233)
0.0108
(0.0624)
‐0.0159
(0.0102)
‐0.00434
(0.0192)
‐0.00143
(0.00177)
0.000441
(0.000778)
0.336***
(0.0745)

‐0.00
0831
(0.0173)
0304
0.00
(0.00
0644)
‐0.00
0106
(0.0172)
0251
‐0.00
(0.00
0281)
‐0.00
0330
(0.00
0531)
‐0.00
00161
(0.000487)
0.000298
(0.000215)
0.128***
(0.0206)

110
0.397

110
0.040

10
11
0.0
041

Observations
O
110
0
R
R‐squared
0.203
3
S
Standard
errors in
i parentheses
* p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
***
p
* p<0.1
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Figure 6b – Nonlinearities (SPF)

VARIABLES
Uncertainty
Tbill6
Inflation
Unemployment
Fed Funds Rate
Monetary Base
Oil Price
Constant

(1)
Cumulative Response at
s=20: Unemployment;
Shock: FFR
‐3.103**
(1.454)
‐0.157
(0.541)
0.928
(1.448)
‐0.104
(0.236)
0.110
(0.447)
‐0.0728*
(0.0410)
‐0.0195
(0.0181)
8.204***
(1.729)

Observations
110
R‐squared
0.079
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(2)
Cumulative Response at
s=20: Inflation; Shock: FFR

(3)
Cumulative Response at
s=20: Unemployment;
Shock: Tbill6

(4)
Cumulative Response at
s=20: Inflation; Shock:
Tbill6

‐1.419***
(0.233)
0.0534
(0.0866)
0.276
(0.232)
‐0.0314
(0.0378)
‐0.0468
(0.0714)
0.0207***
(0.00656)
0.000756
(0.00289)
0.444
(0.277)

1.291
(0.970)
‐0.276
(0.361)
0.101
(0.966)
‐0.286*
(0.157)
0.0640
(0.298)
‐0.0656**
(0.0273)
0.00173
(0.0120)
5.009***
(1.153)

0.128
(0.0938)
‐0.0362
(0.0349)
‐0.0342
(0.0934)
‐0.0110
(0.0152)
0.0251
(0.0288)
‐0.00738***
(0.00264)
‐0.000967
(0.00117)
0.650***
(0.112)

110
0.360

110
0.093

110
0.091

Figure 6c – Nonlinearities (SPF)

VARIABLES
Uncertainty
Tbill6
Inflation
Unemployment
Fed Funds Rate
Monetary Base
Oil Price
Constant

(1)
IRF Slope Through s=4;
Shock: FFR, Response:
Unemployment

(2)
IRF Slope Through s=8;
Shock: FFR, Response:
Unemployment

(3)
IRF Slope Through s=12;
Shock: FFR, Response:
Unemployment

(4)
IRF Slope Through s=20;
Shock: FFR, Response:
Unemployment

‐0.207***
(0.0620)
0.0103
(0.0231)
0.109*
(0.0618)
‐0.00495
(0.0101)
‐0.0141
(0.0190)
‐0.00130
(0.00175)
‐0.000230
(0.000770)
0.708***
(0.0737)

‐0.176**
(0.0758)
‐0.00306
(0.0282)
0.0842
(0.0755)
‐0.00463
(0.0123)
‐0.00112
(0.0233)
‐0.00300
(0.00214)
‐0.000827
(0.000941)
0.604***
(0.0901)

‐0.168**
(0.0814)
‐0.00913
(0.0303)
0.0621
(0.0810)
‐0.00476
(0.0132)
0.00571
(0.0250)
‐0.00370
(0.00229)
‐0.00108
(0.00101)
0.527***
(0.0967)

‐0.155**
(0.0727)
‐0.00785
(0.0271)
0.0464
(0.0724)
‐0.00522
(0.0118)
0.00549
(0.0223)
‐0.00364*
(0.00205)
‐0.000973
(0.000903)
0.410***
(0.0865)

110
0.081

110
0.073

110
0.079

Observations
110
R‐squared
0.130
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 6d – Nonlinearities (SPF)

VARIABLES
Uncertainty
Tbill6
Inflation
Unemployment
Fed Funds Rate
Monetary Base
Oil Price
Constant

(1)
IRF Slope Through s=4;
Shock: FFR, Response:
Inflation

(2)
IRF Slope Through s=8;
Shock: FFR, Response:
Inflation

(3)
IRF Slope Through s=12;
Shock: FFR, Response:
Inflation

(4)
IRF Slope Through s=20;
Shock: FFR, Response:
Inflation

‐0.112***
(0.0290)
0.00403
(0.0108)
0.0229
(0.0289)
0.00172
(0.00472)
‐0.00181
(0.00892)
0.00223***
(0.000818)
5.23e‐05
(0.000361)
‐0.0736**
(0.0345)

‐0.117***
(0.0214)
0.00379
(0.00798)
0.0226
(0.0213)
‐0.00126
(0.00348)
‐0.00285
(0.00658)
0.00183***
(0.000604)
8.01e‐05
(0.000266)
0.00944
(0.0255)

‐0.101***
(0.0170)
0.00332
(0.00632)
0.0195
(0.0169)
‐0.00177
(0.00276)
‐0.00281
(0.00521)
0.00150***
(0.000478)
6.37e‐05
(0.000211)
0.0237
(0.0202)

‐0.0710***
(0.0116)
0.00267
(0.00433)
0.0138
(0.0116)
‐0.00157
(0.00189)
‐0.00234
(0.00357)
0.00103***
(0.000328)
3.78e‐05
(0.000144)
0.0222
(0.0138)

110
0.311

110
0.348

110
0.360

Observations
110
R‐squared
0.200
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

VARIABLES
Uncertainty
Tbill6
Inflation
Unemployment
Fed Funds Rate
Monetary Base
Oil Price
Constant

Figure 6e – Nonlinearities (SPF)

(1)
(2)
IRF Slope Through s=4; Shock: IRF Slope Through s=8; Shock:
Tbill6, Response:
Tbill6, Response:
Unemployment
Unemployment
‐0.157***
(0.0520)
‐0.0156
(0.0194)
0.0327
(0.0518)
‐0.0266***
(0.00844)
0.00297
(0.0160)
‐0.000678
(0.00146)
0.000107
(0.000646)
0.404***
(0.0618)

Observations
110
R‐squared
0.210
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(3)
IRF Slope Through s=12;
Shock: Tbill6, Response:
Unemployment

(4)
IRF Slope Through s=20;
Shock: Tbill6, Response:
Unemployment

‐0.0307
(0.0580)
‐0.0145
(0.0216)
0.0148
(0.0577)
‐0.0218**
(0.00941)
0.00243
(0.0178)
‐0.00267
(0.00163)
0.000146
(0.000720)
0.359***
(0.0689)

0.0360
(0.0583)
‐0.0138
(0.0217)
0.00812
(0.0580)
‐0.0185*
(0.00947)
0.00210
(0.0179)
‐0.00337**
(0.00164)
0.000151
(0.000724)
0.317***
(0.0693)

0.0646
(0.0485)
‐0.0138
(0.0181)
0.00507
(0.0483)
‐0.0143*
(0.00787)
0.00320
(0.0149)
‐0.00328**
(0.00137)
8.66e‐05
(0.000602)
0.250***
(0.0577)

110
0.085

110
0.076

110
0.093
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Figure 6f – Nonlinearities (SPF)
(1)

VARIABLES
Uncertainty
Tbill6
Inflation
Unemployment
Fed Funds Rate
Monetary Base
Oil Price
Constant

IRF Slope Through s=4; Shock:
Tbill6, Response: Inflation
0.0305**
(0.0148)
‐0.00329
(0.00549)
‐0.0102
(0.0147)
‐0.000612
(0.00239)
0.00263
(0.00453)
‐0.00107**
(0.000416)
‐6.77e‐06
(0.000183)
0.0649***
(0.0175)

Observations
110
R‐squared
0.107
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(2)

(3)

(4)

IRF Slope Through s=8; Shock: IRF Slope Through s=12; Shock: IRF Slope Through s=20; Shock:
Tbill6, Response: Inflation
Tbill6, Response: Inflation
Tbill6, Response: Inflation
0.0210**
(0.00964)
‐0.00262
(0.00359)
‐0.00612
(0.00960)
‐0.000243
(0.00157)
0.00206
(0.00296)
‐0.000724***
(0.000272)
‐3.81e‐05
(0.000120)
0.0517***
(0.0115)

0.0138*
(0.00717)
‐0.00240
(0.00267)
‐0.00379
(0.00714)
‐0.000391
(0.00116)
0.00180
(0.00220)
‐0.000555***
(0.000202)
‐5.19e‐05
(8.91e‐05)
0.0437***
(0.00853)

0.00642
(0.00469)
‐0.00181
(0.00175)
‐0.00171
(0.00467)
‐0.000548
(0.000762)
0.00126
(0.00144)
‐0.000369***
(0.000132)
‐4.84e‐05
(5.83e‐05)
0.0325***
(0.00558)

110
0.113

110
0.105

110
0.091
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